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THE EMERGENCE OF NEW RIGHTS
IN THE AFRICAN CHARTER
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1981, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) adopted a Charter
for the promotion and protection of human rights on the continent of
Africa.' It proved to be a remarkable document for it represents a
significant departure from international and regional human rights
instruments which have preceded it, in that it is singularly African and
responsive to uniquely African circumstances.2
Consistent with the pledge made by the OAU to "have due regard to
the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights," '
3 
and to "reaffirm their adherence to the principles of human and
peoples' rights and freedoms contained in the declarations, conventions,
and other instruments adopted by the OAU, and the United Nations,"
4 
the
African Charter enumerates conventional norms, rights, and freedoms
ascribed to the individual.5 However, the Charter also embodies two
startling innovations. For example, the Charter specifies peoples' rights.
Five provisions, all aspirational in nature, name not the individual, but
peoples, as beneficiaries.' The drafters' philosophy that these peoples'
1. African Charter an Heman and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. DO.
CAB/LEG/67/4/Rev.5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter Aftican Charter].
There has been some confusion ver the title of the Charter, which is sometimes known
as the Banjul Charter, after Banjul, Gambia, the site of the two Ministerial Conferences that
resulted in the final draft of the Charter. Many States felt there would be confusion with the
Charter of the Organization of African Unity. Their concern, if it was warranted, was not
heeded, and today the document is known both officially and unofficially as the African
Charter. Gittleman, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis, 22
VA. J. INT'L L. 667, n.j (1982).
2. van Boven, The Relations Between Peoples' Rights and Human Righs in the African
Charter, 7 Hum. RTS. L.J. 183, 186 (1986).
3. African Charter, supra note 1, preamble, cl. 3.
4. Id. el. 9.
5. The authors of the African Charter recognized it was "prudent not to deviate much ftem
the international norms solemnly adopted in various universal instruments by the different
member states of the OAU." OAU DOe. CABILEG/67/3, Rev. 1, at 2.
6. Although the concept of "peoples" has enjoyed some curency in international law, the
307
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rights are pivotal to the Charter's objective is reflected by the title: the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
7
The five rights, which in the African Charter are ascribed to peoples,
are "new rights" in the process of acquiring recognition as international
norms. These rights are highly controversial and have provoked lengthy
debate since they were first proposed as human rights norms in the
1970s The African Charter is the first major legally authoritative
human rights instrument to incorporate the new rights as independent
provisions.
9  
Such official acceptance considerably enhances their
judicial status and is highly significant for the international legal
community. to
In addition, African traditions and the values of African civilization
have been carefully utilized as the basis of the Charter," the implication
of which is that in the future cultural identity will be a much stronger
factor in the drafting of regional human rights instruments.' This Note
suggests that an enduring contribution to the development of global
human rights norms has been made by the African Charter, for it
demonstrates that human rights norms are not universally applicable but
rather vary with time and according to regional cultural variations.
dynamic use made by the African Charter of the term "peoples' rights" has thnut it into much
greater pre-eminence within international human rights law. Recently a number of international
human rights instruments and General Assembly Resolutions have referred to the rights of
peoples, "particularly those dealing with self-detemination and sovereignty over natural
resources." Rermbe, Africa aw Regional Protection of Human Rights (1985), quoted in
Kiwanuka, The Meaning of'People' in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
82 AMER. J. INT'L L. 80, 81 (1988).
7. The full title of the Charter immediately raises the question of definition of 'peoples',
which is conspicuously not offered by the Charter's authors. One goal of the Charter is to
preserve the African perspective, a relevant aspect of which is that in Africa a person is viewed
"not as an isolated and abstract individual, but an integral member of a group animated by a
spirit of solidarity." Rapporteur's repolt, OAU Doc. CM/1149 (XXXVI), Amex 1, at 4, para.
13 (1981), quoted in Kiwantaa, supra note 6, at 82 n. 11.
8. See Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s, 33 RUTGERS L.
REV. 441, 442-50 (1981).
9. Kiwanuka, supra note 6, at 81.
10. See Klingenthal Symposium: On Peoples' Rights and Human Rights, Strasbourg, Apr.
10, 1985,7 Hum. RTS. L.J. 410,413 (1986) (discussing individual and collective rights, noting
that "for the fist time in history, responsibilities of individuals vis-vis peoples in other nations
were arising"). Id. at 413.
11. African Charter, spra note 1, preamble, cl. 4.
12. See Cobbh, African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective, 9
HMu. RTs. Q. 307, 328-29 (1987).
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II. PEOPLE'S RIGHTS IN THE AFRICAN CHARTER
The first eighteen of the twenty-nine articles of enumerated ights and
duties that comprise Part I of the African Charter
13 
are conventional
norms, while articles 19 through 24 specifically name "[a]ll peoples" as the
beneficiaries.
4 
Chapter II of Part I elaborates upon the duties of the
individual," while the remainder of the Charter is composed of measures




Article 19 provides for the equality of all peoples, which prohibits the
domination of one people by another.
8 
This right, which is not amongst
the "new rights," refers to the aim of the Charter to eliminate colonialism,
apartheid, and discrimination. Article 20 sets out the ight to self-
determination as it interrelates with the right to development. Article
21 claims the peoples' sovereignty over their own natural resources,
2 
and
article 22 specifies the tight to development, proclaiming that "[a]ll peoples
shall have the right to their economic, social, and cultural development.
13. African Charter, see supra note 1.
14. Id. arts. 19-24.
15. Id. arts. 27-29.
16. Id. arts. 30-63.
17. Id. arts. 64-66.
18. Article 19 of the Charter provides: "All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the
same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify domination of a people by
another." Id. art. 19.
19. Id. preamble, cl. 8.
20. Atticle 20 of the Charter provides:
1. All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable
and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their
political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according
to the policy they have freely chosen.
2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the
bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international
community.
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States parties to the
present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political,
economic or cultural.
Id. art. 20.
21. Article 21 of the Charter provides in relevant part: (1) All peoples shall freely dispose
of their wealth and natrul resoorces . . . (4) States parties to the present Charter shall
individually and collectively exercise the right to free disposal of their wealth and natual
rsources with a view to strengthening African unity and solidarity. Id. art. 21.
309
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.. .,22 Article 23 asserts the "right to national and international peace
and security. .. "2 and lastly, article 24 declares that "[a]ll people . .
* shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to
their development."
24
Some scholars are of the view that peoples' rights are not rights in
the legal sense at all, but, rather, are lofty ideals.
25 
Others assert that
they are mere political catchwords that are typical of those used by the
developing countries as a manifestation of their call for a New Interna-
tional Economic Order.
26 
However, these very same rights have been
the theme of many important human rights instrument in the past and
have become the subject of intense discussion within the arena of human
rights legal scholarship."
A. The Concept of New Rights
1. The Three Generations of Rights
The birth of international human rights can be traced to the
movement for the rights of man in eighteenth century Europe.
28 
At
that time the concerns of the bourgeois classes over their individual
freedoms and political role led to the French and American Revolu-
tions.29 By taking power, the people were able to institute civil and
political rights. These rights were conceived negatively as "freedoms
from" rather than as positive "rights to."
30 
They required the prohibi-
22. Id at. 22.
23. Id art. 23.
24. Id art. 24.
25. See, e.g., Bondzie-Simpson, A Critique of the African Charter on Human And Peoples'
Rights, 31 HOWAuD L. 643, 657 (1988).
26. Alstn, Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case for the Right to Development,
1 HARV. HUM. RnS. Y.B. 3, 22 (1988) (in which the author summarizes the approach of the
Reagan administration to the eight to development, in direct opposition to its foreign policy).
27. Alston, A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or
Obfiscation of International Human Rights Law?, 29 NmET. INr'L L. Rev. 307, 308 (1982).
28. Marks, supra note 8, at 437.
29. id at 438. While the concept of human eights is neither exclusively nor essentially
Western, the French and American Revolutions were pivotal in the elaboration of international
law. For a discussion of the privileged position occupied by Western Europe and North
America in the formulation of much of our international human rights law, see L. HENKIN, T"le
RiGHTS OF MAN TODAY (1978).
30. Marks, supra note 8, at 438.
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tion of interference by the state with the freedom of the individual.3'
Today they are embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.32
A second wave of human rights, consisting of claims rather than
freedoms, owes its emergence to the socialistic revolutions against
exploitation that took place in the early 1900s." This was a generation
of social and economic rights that was designed to improve the material
realities of social conditions, and required the intervention, rather than
the abstention, of the state.' These rights correspond to the rights that
are enumerated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights. The distinction between those rights that are
"inalienable," permanent, and universal and those bestowed by the law
of a state, gave rise to the concept of generations of rights.
3 
Civil and
political rights are those of the first generation, while second generation
rights are those directed at economic security and independence."
The usefulness of the distinction may be found in Dr. Karel Vasak's
vision of three generations of rights.
3 
He perceived a correspondence
31. Id
32. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. These rights
are essentially freedom of opinion, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and of the
press, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary detention or arrest,
and freedom from interference in correspondence. Sohn, The New International Law:
Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 Am. U.L Rov. 1, 23-24 (1982).
33. Sohn, supra note 32, at 33.
34. Marks, supra note 8, at 438. These rights are in essence the right to work, the right to
social security and the right to opportunity for advancement, and have been expanded upon in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to include the rights to form and join trade unions;
the right to rest and leisure, including holidays with pay; the right to an adequate standard of
living, including food, clothing, housing and medical care; the right to social security, especially
against unemployment, sickness and old age; the right to education; the right to participate in
the cultural life of the community; the right to protection of scientific, literary and artistic
production. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), 3 U.N. GAOR (1)
71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Dectlarationl; see Sohn, supra note 32, at 45-
48.
35. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Civil Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICSECRI; see Sohn,
supra note 32, at 45-48.
36. See Marks, supra note 8, at 438.
37. Id.
38. Credited with development of the concept of the third generation of rights is Karel
Vasak, when he headed the United Nations Human Rights Committee. Marks, supra note 8,
at 441 (quoting K. Vasak, Lecture to the Tenth Study Session of the International Institution
N.Y.L. SCH. 1. INT'L & CoMP. L. [Vol. 12
between the first, second, and third generation rights, the latter of which
are currently emerging, and the French ideals of "liberte, egalite, frat-
ernite.
"
"s The third generation, he said, "... . are human rights born of
the brotherhood of men and their indispensable solidarity. Are these not
tenets which would unite men in the finite world? Such is the orienta-





generation, he continued, was intended to suggest the progression and
development of society, with new rights evolving as earlier rights began
to sink deeper roots.
4
'
Vasak labels these rights 'new' in the sense that they represent new
aspirations.
42 
It was part of the recent initiative, he said, to "infuse the
human dimension into areas where it has all too often been missing,
having been left to the State."
43 
The notion of solidarity, he assured
his dissenters, is not the perquisite of the third generation rights, for all
of Human Rights (July 1979).
For a concise summary of the principal assumptions behind the concept of solidarity
rights, and the main sources of their analysis, see Alston, supra note 27. Alston argues that a
third generation of solidarity rights would not devalue existing rights for a dynamic approach
to formulating human rights is essential to their validity and adequacy over time. Id at 322.
He cautions, however, that the 'right' to draw up "intemational shopping lists" by "appealing
to the favorite concerns of each of the main geopolitical blocs" would seem to "contribute more
obfuscation than clarification in an area which can ill afford to be made less accessible to the
masses than it already is." lI
39. Marks, supra note 8, at 441.
40. See id
41. See d The concept of a third generation of rights has been highly controversial. Id.
at 451. Opponents object that it tends to detract from the effective implementation of other
rights, that the proliferation of new rights weakens those already recognized, and that the word
"generation" connotes succession, implying that the "old" rights are outdated, no longer
necessary, and have been replaced with new ones. Id. They claim the new rights are vague and
imprecise, in fact are not rights at all, but political and social principles, or rights only in the
morat sense, and they threaten to undermine the integrity of our existing human rights system.
Id.; see also Sohn, sapra note 32, at 61.
42. Vasak conceives that the new rights are innovative and progressive, and belong to the
"New Frontier" where in no way can they interfere with the established domains of the other
generations. [d. at 441. Other proponents of the third generation believe that it is a valid
method of preserving and defining existing human rights while taking into account the dynamic
nature of the emergence of human rights. Id. at 439-40. From this perspective, the concept of
generations is a useful analytical tool because it enables us to see the manner and direction in
which the human rights tradition has evolved. See, e.g., id. at 451. Professor Sohn believes the
current relevance of the new human rights lies somewhere in between the two extremes, that
the new rights establish new goals that can be achieved progressively, by one step after another.
See Sohn, supra note 32, at 63.
43. Marks, supra note 8. at 441.
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human rights require solidarity for their achievement, but the new rights
are based on the concept of solidarity, without which the chief concerns
of the world community, such as peace, development, and the environ-
ment, cannot be realized."
2. Candidates for Recognition as New Rights
The waiting list of rights seeking consideration for inclusion in the
new rights category is lengthy and varied, but only seven have survived
as truly serious candidates. 4' They are the right to development," the
right to the environment, 4 the right to peace,
48 
the right to communi-
cate,4' to right to share in the common heritage of mankind,"e the
right to be different,
5
' and the right to receive humanitarian assis-
tance.
5 2 All but the last two are specifically enumerated as peoples'
rights in the African Charter."
The problem with the new rights is not so much their proliferation
as their haphazard manner of expansion.' Every interest group seeks
to locate its cause under the banner of Human Rights.
55 
However, no
qualified body, such as the United Nations or the United Nations Educa-
tion, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), has ever established
any kind of formalized procedure for their evaluation and recognition. 6
44. Marks, supra note 8, at 441.
45. Alston, supra note 27, at 307.
46. See Mifa text accompanying notes 96-105.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 118-25.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 106-17.
49. INT'L COMM'N FOR TE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION PROBS., MANY VOIES, ONE
WORLD 172 (1980).
50. Declaration f Principles Governing the Sea-Bed, 22 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1516th mtg.) at
3, U.N. Doec. A/C. 1(PV. 1516 (1967); Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A.
Res. 3281(XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter
Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties].
51. UNESCO, UNESCO'S STANDARD-SEtrrTiNG INSTitUMENTS ILe.1 (1981).
52. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick, Aug. 12, 1949,
ch. 1, art 7, 6 U.S.T. 3115, 3318, T.t.A.S. No. 3362 (1949); International Committee of the
Red Cress, Protocols Additional to the Conventions of 12 August 1949,16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
53. African Charter, supra note I, arts. 19-24.
54. See Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposalfor Quality Control, 78 Am.
J. INT'L L. 607, 608 (1984).
35. Id.
56. I at 613.
314 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 12
Voicing their opposition to recognition of new rights are detractors who
claim that they are too vague and exaggerated, which allows states to vote
in favor of them without commitment to their realization.
57
3. Pressures to Proclaim New Rights
The proclamation of human rights as a means of gaining support for
a cause is a time-honored technique, ever since the Magna Carta.5' Many
human rights documents come into being because of someone's just
cause.
59 
The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights'
was different, for it represented agreement by the international community
on a common standard of human rights. This was only possible because
member states accepted the General Assembly as arbiter, recognizing its
authority to determine which claims could be deemed rights and which
could not." Article 13 of the United Nations Charter mandates the
General Assembly to "initiate studies and make recommendations for the
purpose of... assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all."' Therefore, the authority that the states vested in the
General Assembly rested on finn legal foundations.'
Previously, this international standard was sufficiently inclusive to
allow for stabilization and the realization of extant rights." However, at
the present time, there are pressures to proclaim more rights." Human
rights are by nature dynamic. The challenge is to find the balance between
the integrity and credibility of the human rights tradition on the one hand,
and the inherent dynamism of these rights on the other, so that we may
continue to respond appropriately to new threats to human dignity."
57. Id.
58. Id at 608.
59. Id.
60. Universal Declaration, supra note 34.
61. Many members of the drafting committee lost confidence that consensus could be
achieved, and suggested that a much lesser goal be set. UNESCO, HuMAN Riotrs: CoMMENTs
ANO INTERPREATtONS 93-95 (1949).
62. U.N. Charter art. 13.
63. Alston, supra note 54, at 609.
64. I
65. Id
66. Id Fears that the addition of new rights would seriously damage our concept of human
rights have proved groundless, for the success of many recent instruments in which they ae
contained, including the African Charter, has encouraged demand for their adoption. Id. at 610-
It.
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B. Legal Status of New Rights
Analysis of the international legal character of the new rights in order
to determine their usefulness as global norms may be enhanced by their
review within the context of the African Charter. In other words, these
rights must be viewed as belonging not to states but to peoples.67
International human rights are human needs that have received formal
recognition as rights through sources of international law, including
treaties, custom, and general principles." When a right is first proposed,
it really is not a right at all, but a desire for the realization of that right.69
Recognition of the rights expressed in the African Charter is a crucial step
toward securing them.
The new rights are new in more than simply the sense of having been
recently enumerated.7 Prior to recognition as a legitimate human right,
a candidate must undergo a maturation process.' The rights that were
incorporated into the Universal Declaration and the International Covenants
were already recognized in national and domestic legislation and in
constitutions.73 Claims arising from those rights had been heavily
scrutinized at the national level and had been presented confidently to the
international level after many years of analysis, reflection, and revision.74
The new rights, on the other hand, are conceived directly in international
fora, where they are presented for endorsement as rights, before they have
received the benefit of careful prior scrutiny." Consequently, they are in
danger of being characterized as social values rather than as legal
principles." Nevertheless, because society values these principles so
67. Kiwanuka, supra note 6, at 84.
68. Marks, supra note 8, at 436.
69. Lopatka, The Right to Live in Peace as a Human Right, 10 BuLL. PFcE PRoPosALs
361, 362 (1979).
70. Sohn, supra note 32, at 59.
71. See Marks, supra note 8, at 441.
72. See id.
73. Alston, supra note 54, at 614.
74. 1d.
75. IdA
76. Ida The fundamental skepticism of opponents to the new rights is that their rcognition
as tights rather than simply as aspirational principles represents an erosion of the concept of
human rights and that it demonstrates the inability of the international community to resist the
"temptation of enumerating so-called tights, that would be no move than the ephemeral ideals
of a transient age." Alston, supra note 27, at 312 (quoting Address by Piene de Senarclens,
CollDquita on the New Human Rights: The Right of Solidarity (Aug. 1980)).
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much, it is necessary to determine what kind of efforts can be made in
order to accord them legal sufficiency. Peace, for example, has a
remarkably high value in society.' Although it is so important, no one
has been able to accomplish it by faith or morals, so we desire that its
realization has to be given the force of law.
7
'
The distinction between a desire that a right exist and the right itself
resides in its legal basis.? The Universal Declaration is widely regarded
as part of customary international law and therefore, all states are bound
by the principles and obligations therein?" The International Covenants
are binding on member states but, unless and until they attain the status of
customary international law, the occurrence of which is a function of time
and general acceptance by the world community, states that are not party
to the Covenants are not legally bound by them."
! 
In other words, the
rights enumerated therein possess a less than absolute degree of legal
force."
C. Test of Viability of Rights
Professor George Abi-Saab proposes three indices by which to test the
viability of a legal norm:
3 
the degree of consensus over the social value
in question;" the concreteness of the content, that is whether the content
of the social value is specific enough to become operational as law;' and
the existence of a follow-up mechanism that operates as a continuous
pressure for compliance."
The first step towards determining the recognition afforded a norm
amongst the international community is to identify an already established
body of law on the subject.'
7 
Without such a body of law, the requisite
77. Lopatka, supra note 69, at 361, 363.
78. id at 363.
79. ld. at 365.
80. See Sohn, supra note 32, at 17.
81. See id at 20.
82. See id
83. Abi-Saab, The Legal Forrulation of a Right to Devetopment, in LE DRorr Au
DEvLOpPPEMENT Au PLAN INTERNATIoNAL [THE RIGHT To DEVELOPMENT AT THE
INTERNATrONAL LEVEL] 159, 160 (Rt. Dupuy ed. 1980).
84. Id. at 161.
85. ld at 161-62.
86. Id. at 174.
87. Marks, supra note 8, at 436.
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maturation cannot occur, for no opportunity is available for close
examination of, and experience with, the proposed right!' International
law is made by treaties and other international agreements and by
customary behavior and expectations." Inclusion of a norm in legal
documents and its establishment as the subject of study, analysis, and
observation by international agencies enhance the standing of the norm.'
The second criterion established by Professor Abi-Saab is more
difficult to ascertain. Unless a qualified expert body, such as the United
Nations Human Rights Commission, speaking for the world community,
has studied, analyzed, and reached a general consensus on the precise
definition of the norm in question, its meaning remains somewhat
speculative."
The third index of juridical viability depends upon the existence of a
mechanism that will generate pressure for compliance.' The appearance
of peoples' rights in the African Charter such as the right to development,
the right to peace, and the right to a satisfactory environment presents an
opportunity to apply Professor Abi-Saab's analysis in order to determine
whether these rights may be said to have achieved the status to which they
aspire, that of legitimate, juridical human rights norms.
1. The Right to Development
The right to development is well advanced in acquiring the status of
an internationally recognized right.
93 
There is a branch of international
law on development, with related text-books, specialized courses, and
conferences." It was first formulated as a human right by Keba M'Baye,
the first president of the Supreme Court of Senegal, and president of the
International Court of Jurists, during the 1972 Strasbourg Inaugural
Lecture, in which he elaborated upon the economic, legal, moral, and
political justifications for the existence of the right to development.
5 
The
United Nations followed with an exhaustive study of the international
88. Id.
89. L CH.N CoNMEMOoAy IrEaNATIOINAL LAw 3 (1989).
90. Lopatka, supra note 69, at 365.
91. AIston, supra note 54, at 613.
92. Abi-Saab, supra note 83, at 160.
93. Marks, supra note 8, at 444.
94. d
95. M'Baye, Le doit au developpement comre un droit de 1homme, 5 HUM. RTS. J. 505
(1972), quoted in Marks, supra note 8, at 444.
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dimensions of the right to development in relation to other human rights,
which led to a vote by the Commission on Human Rights that 'the right
to development is a human right."" In December 1986, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right to
Development."
Considerably more important than the very political and highly
polemical debate over the legal existence of the right to development is
continued dialogue in an attempt to reach a consensus on the content,
purpose, and dimensions of this right." Briefly summarized, this right
consists of the right of the individual to benefit from a development
policy based on material and nonmaterial needs and to participate in that
development policy, and also the collective right of a developing country
to the establishment of a new international economic order.
9  
This
would enable each individual to realize his or her potentialities in
harmony with the community. In other words, the human being is
viewed as the subject and not the object of the development process.'"
On a practical level, this translates into the right of communities of
particularly indigenous peoples to develop their culture and maintain
possession of their land and cultural resources in the face of economic
development policies that threaten their extinction.' This concept is
distinctly controversial
0 2 
and its precise definition is extremely
complex. However, it is clear that the notion of solidarity, or intema-
tional cooperation and shared responsibility for the welfare and
prosperity of all, is central to the realization of this new right.0 3
2. The Right to Peace
The law of peace is a part of the classical subdivision of the subject
matter of international law.'0" The principles of peaceful coexistence,
peaceful change, and the prohibition of coercion all find expression in
96. Marks, supra note 8, at 445.
97. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 411128, Aatex, 41 GAOR Sapp.
(No. 53) at 186, U.N. Do. A141/53 (1986).
98. See Alston, supra note 26, at 20-21.
99. Marks, supra note 8, at 445.
100. Son, sapra note 32, at 53-56.
101. Id
102. Alston, supra note 26, at 40.
103. See Marks, supra note 8, at 445.
104. Md
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a variety of national and international legal instruments.t"s
The express aim of the United Nations, as delineated in article 1 of
the Charter, is the preservation of peace and international security.' °"
Many other basic documents contain a broad reference to a right to
peace.'
0 7 
In 1978, the General Assembly, in a Resolution entitled the
Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace,'





Although the right to peace has been the subject of an important
General Assembly Resolution" and has now been included in the
African Charter,"' a regional document of landmark significance, its
elements have never been determined. No effort has yet been undertak-
en to elevate the term beyond the level of generalities or to allow it to
develop a practical usefulness."
2
The principle that the right to peace, and the right to live in peace,
entail more than the obligation of states not to engage in aggressive war
is already firmly established in international law."
3  
Some possible
extensions of this right involve related rights, duties, and obligations,
many of which are already implied in existing rights and guarantees." 4
For instance, the right of all people to participate in the decisions of
their government regarding war and peace is implicit in recognized
105. id
106. U.N. Charter, supra note 1, art. 1, par. 1.
107. A right to peace was specifically advocated for the first time in 1929 in the Kellogg-
Briand Pact. The right to peace may also be deduced from the Declaration on Principles of
Friendly Relations, the Final Act of Helsinki, and many others. See Marks, supra note 8, at
445-46.
108. Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Pence, G.A. Rm. 33/3,33 U.N.
GAOR Annex I (Agenda Item 50) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/33(486 (1979) [hereinafter Declaration
on the Preparation of Societies].
109. Ui The Declaration asks States to observe the principle that
[e]very nation and every huana being, regardless of race, conscience, language or
sex, has the inherent right to life in peace. Respect for that right, as wall as for the
other huran rights, is in the common interest of all mankind and an indispensable
condition of advancement of all nations, large and small, in all fields.
ld. at 2.
110. See Declaration on the Preparation of Societies, supra note 108.
111. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 23, pars. 1.
112. See Alston, Peace as a Human Right, 11 BuLL. PEAce PROoAsAS 126, 133 (1981).
113. See Bilder, The Individual and the Right to Peace, 11 BuLL. PEAcE PROPOSALS 387,
387 (1982); see also Alston, supra note 112, at 130-31.
114. See Bilder, supra note 113, at 388.
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rights of political participation. Furthermore, the right of conscientious
objection is already contained in the guarantee of freedom of cons-
cience."'
3. The Right to the Environment
The right to the environment possesses the most extensive specialized
body of law than do the other new generation rights. This developed as
a result of popular pressure against mismanagement of the environment and
in favor of improved ecological coexistence. 6 Its first formulation as
a right was in the Stockholm Declaration in 1972.1 Since then, numer-
ous efforts have been made to achieve international recognition for the
right to a clean and healthy environment. Several national constitutions
have already incorporated this right"'
The individual dimension is the right of any victim or potential victim
of an environmentally damaging activity to obtain reparation for harm
suffered, while the collective dimension involves the duty of the state to
assist in cooperating internationally to resolve environmental problems. 9
This right rests on the same basis as all solidarity rights, that is, that the
State has a duty to place the human interest before the national or
individual interest.no
In summary, the rights to development, peace, and the environment
each have an established body of law, hut are rather weak in the area of
115. See id. Asbom Hide believes that the right also embraces the freedom of the individual
to refuse to participate in aggressive military operations. Id. This freedom goes beyond refusal
purely on the grounds of pacifism, but imposes on the individual the obligation of not
complying with orders which, if carried out, would be a violation of the right to live in peace.
See Lopatka, supra note 69, at 366.
116. Marks, supra note 8, at 443.
117. hd This formulation was adopted by the UN Conference on the Environment in 1972.
ld; Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 5-
16, 1972, 1 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doec. A/Conf. 48/14, reprinted in I B. RusTr & B. StMsA,
IN ATIONA.L PRoTEcToN OF THE ENviRONMENT. TREAToss AND RELATED DocuMENTS 118
(1975) [hereinafter 1972 Stockholm Declarations].
118. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany has proposed an additional protocol to
the European Convention. Express national provisions exist in the constitutions of Spain,
Portugal, Peru, and Yugoslavia. Finally, constitutions that stipulate that the government shall
protect the environment include Greece, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic
Republic, USSR, PRC, Sri Lanka, and Bulgaria. See Marks, supra note 8, at 443-44.
119. Marks, supra note 8, at 444.
120. See id,
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content."' Sufficient discussion and study, however, have already taken
place to extract elements that can be utilized as a basis for their official
definition."'
D. The Notion of Solidarity
The third prong for evaluating the juridical viability of these rights is
their mechanism for enforcement,"
3 
the key to which is their relevance
to the notion of solidarity."
4 
The realization of solidarity rights lies not
in law enforcement, but in "inter-nation" unity and cooperation. Implicitly,
the achievement of solidarity rights springs from the ability to establish
solidarity within society."3
The principles that dominated international law in the 1970s have
evolved from an emphasis on sovereign equality, prohibition of the use of
force, self-determination, and non-intervention into the more modem and
progressive orientation of international law, with the establishment of a
new International Economic Order,"
s 
and recent United Nations
Declarations such as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States." Even in this new realm of law, states remain the bearers of
rights and duties." The African Charter develops the law of coopera-
tion one further step."
9 
While it acknowledges the existing governmen-
tal and state order of Africa, at the same time it makes it clear that the
state is not an end in itself, but rather derives its meaning and legitimacy
from its peoples
3° 
By ascribing the new rights specifically to peoples,
the African Charter has clarified the relationship between these rights and
the notion of solidarity."'
Ultimately the expression of norms matters less than compliance with
121. See Alston, supra note 27, at 309; Alston, supra note 112, at 135.
122. Alstn, supra note 27, at 309; Alston, supra note 112. at 135.
123. Abi-Saab, sapa note 83, at 160-61.
124. Alston, supra note 112, at 128.
125. Id. at 135.
126. van Doven, supra note 2, at 189 & n. 11.
127. Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties, supra note 50. Professor van Boven calls
this phenomenon the law of coexistence giving way to the emerging law of cooperation. van
Boven, supra note 2, at 189.
128. See id. at 190.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Kiwanaka, supra note 6, at 84.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMp. L.
them. Unlike domestic law, international law does not require a system of
courts and sanctions to accomplish its objectives. The most powerful tool
the international community can utilize in order to secure compliance with
an international mandate is the support of world public opinion."
3 2 
War
itself, for example, and in particular, nuclear war, is unlawful, but no
international tribunal can prevent it.' Only the concerted effort of
nations working together to prevent its outbreak can succeed. The
existence of economic and other disparities is inconsistent with the
maintenance of world peace and stability.' 3  At the same time, the
increasing interdependence of all peoples underscores the need to spread
responsibility for the promotion of peace, development, and a healthful
environment amongst all nations. The notion of solidarity is therefore the
essence of the realization of the new rights.
3
'
E The Contextual Approach
In order to promote and preserve human rights in societies with
various social and political backgrounds, a contextual interpretation is
required." This type of approach has been the prevailing one ever since
third world nations have become active participants in the human rights
debate
3
' and have subsequently pressed for international recognition of
a right to development in the face of injustices in the present world
economic order."'
Legal documents express policy. The policy theme of the African
Charter is freedom from domination by another power, and this theme is
also applied to the area of development.'" If this theme is further
utilized as the motivation for peoples' rights, these very rights are then
related within the body of the Charter to the actual conditions of life of the
peoples of Africa, though these conditions are clearly not necessarily
restricted to Africa alone."
° 
In this way, the African Charter is an
132. Alston, supra note 112, at 135.
133. Lopatka, supra note 69, at 361-62.
134. Alston. supra note 112, at 128.
135. Id.
136. See van Boven, supra note 2, at 186.
137. Id. at 187.
138. Id.
139. AfTican Charter, spra note 1, preamble, cls. 3, 8; see Charter of the Organization of
African Unity, May 25, 1963, arts. 9, 11-13, No. 6947, 479 U.N.T.S. 76, 78 (1963).
140. African Charter, supra note 1, preamble, cls. 3, 8.
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excellent example of the contextual approach to human rights. The
contextual factor is in fact clarified in the preamble, which specifies that
the "virtues of African historical tradition and the values of African
civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the
concept of human and peoples' rights" will be taken into consider-
ation.141
F. The Judicial Character of New Rights
Although much remains to be done in the areas of definition and
formal recognition, the rights to peace, development, and a healthful
environment appear to exhibit all the necessary characteristics of legal
norms. Each has an established body of law, a sufficient degree of
consensus as to content, and is increasingly well-supported by world public
opinion. The African Charter, by nominating peoples rather than states to
become the bearers of the new rights, makes it quite clear, however, that
the effectiveness of these norms, and their durability as legal mechanisms,
depends upon the existence of solidarity within society.'
42 
In other
words, whether or not the high ideals expressed in human rights agree-
ments achieve their realization is not simply a question of legal classifica-
tion, but rather, depends upon the ability to build inter-nation cooperation
on a world-wide scale.
45
Despite the strong resistance to the idea of new human rights,'" the
dynamic quality of these rights has enabled them to surface.
4 
Their
appearance in the African Charter'" has renewed debate over their legal
significance, but not one of this group of new rights is unknown in the
international human rights arena, whether as a stated provision in the U.N.
Charter, the Universal Declaration, or other prominent human rights
instruments.'
47  
Nevertheless, a question remains as to whether the
African Charter is similar to the Universal Declaration, with its solid legal
foundations, or is more akin to the Communist Manifesto of 1848 or the
141. Id. preamble, cl. 4.
142, Kisvanula, supra note 6, at 101.
143. Id. at 100.
144. Marks, supra note 8, at 440.
145. Id. at 451.
146. Aflican Charter, supra note 1, arts. 19-24.
147. See, e.g., UNESCO Declaration, supra note 51, art. 3 (1978); Charter of the Economic
Rights and Duties, supra note 50; Declaration on the Right to Development, sapra note 97;
Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Prace, G.A. Res. 39/11, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 51) at 22, U.N. Doe. A/39/51 (1984).
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Atlantic Charter of 1941, both of which were stellar catalysts to reform or
revolution.
The enduring vitality of the human rights movement depends on the
extent to which it can respond to concerns with which the majority of the
world's peoples are preoccupied.'
4
' The African Charter is the embodi-
ment of the mandate of the Organization for African Unity. This
organization is a legal entity and the African states have agreed to be
bound by its edicts." In this way, it rests upon valid legal founda-
tions. t ' The new rights appear to be ready to emerge. By substantiating
their legal status, the African Charter has made a significant contribution
not only to the cause of African human rights, but also to international
human rights.
III. THE CHARTER'S USE OF AFRIcAN CULTURE
Human rights emanate from philosophical, ideological, and economic
bases.' Just as norms have emerged in response to changes in social
and political circumstances over time, so they are affected by geographical
and cultural conditions.'
5
A. Philosophical Development of Human Rights in the West
The question of whether or not the concept of human rights is entirely
Western is the subject of an ongoing debate.'
53 If it is, then the inquiry
should be focussed upon whether contemporary international human rights
instruments can be said to apply to people from non-Western cultures."
The conception of human rights that forms the basis of the Universal
Declaration
55 
and the two International Covenants" as well as the
European and American regional instruments" stems from the doctrine
148. See Alston, supra note 54, at 609.
149. See Gitleman, supra note 1, at 667.
150. See id. at 669-70.
151. See Motala, Hunan Rights in Africa: A Cultura4 Ideological and Legal Examination,
12 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 373, 408-09 (1989).
152. See id. at 373.
153. Cobbah, supra note 12, at 309.
154. Id.
155. See Universal Declaration, supra note 34.
156. ICCPR, supra note 32; ICSECR, supra note 35 (together constituting an International
Bill of Rights).
157. European Convention for the Protection of Hunan Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
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of liberalism.' Until liberalism emerged as a reaction to medieval
political thought, the individual was simply a part of society. He was
without rights other than those traditions which existed for him as a
member of an ongoing, established community."
9 
In seventeenth and
eighteenth century Europe, a new intellectual and political tradition was
bom out of the writings of Hobbes and Locke, in which the individual was
liberated from the holistic totality of medieval society.'" The revolution-
ary theory of natural rights developed from liberalism. This theory
consisted of the belief that autonomous man possessed rights in nature
which were prior to and supreme over the sovereignty of all other
associations, including that of the state'
6
' Individual man had become
isolated from his collective associational identity.'"
This drastic change in philosophy caused feudalistic tradition to give
way to an industrialized, capitalistic society.'" People demanded
participation in the political process, and individual rights became a legal
tool. In America, the settler mentality, which rewarded the virtues of
competition and initiative, served to extend the individualistic tradition, that
by now had become the customary norm throughout the Western
world.'"
Thus, the Universal Declaration embodies a tradition that is entirely
Western in its philosophical development." The freedoms it cherishes
are those which pertain directly to the right of the autonomous individual
to do as he likes. The claims for enhancement of material conditions are
expressed from an individual perspective and not from the collective
entity.'" The European Convention is based on the Universal Declara-
tion'
6
' and the concepts of the latter bear close resemblance to those in
213 U.N.T.S. 22 [hereinafter Eurnpean Convention]; American Convention on Human Rights,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 at 1, O.A.S. off. Rec. Doe. OEA/ser.tjV/t.23, doc. 21 rev. 6, reprinted in
9 LL.M. 99 (1970) [hereinafter American Conventionl.
158. See Cobbah, supra note 12, at 312.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 312-13.
161. Id. at 314.
162. See id. at 313.
163. Id. at 315.
164. Id.
165. Motala, supra note 151, at 373.
166. See Cobbah, supro note 12, at 316.
167. Motala, supra note 151, at 377.
N.Y.L. SCH. J INT'L & COMP. L.
the American Bill of Rights.' In turn, these principles are likewise the
basis for the American Declaration."
R Colonialism and Its Aftermath
During the colonial period, Western political and legal systems were
superimposed upon the customary traditions of the African people."0 At
the time of independence, African countries inherited Western notions of
individual rights and constitutional law.' However, these philosophical
constructs failed to take account of the actual development of African
social traditions, and therefore cannot be considered a comprehensive study
of the elements necessary to the well-being and enhancement of the
African citizen.'
The elements that constitute acceptable human rights practice depend
on the cultural and historical perspective of those in power. For instance,
at one time feudalism, slavery, and colonialism were not considered
incompatible with human rights."
3 
The individualistic conception of
human rights that is reflected in the Universal Declaration indicates the
domination of the Western world."4  The English author Maurice
Cranston asserts that human rights are universal because human nature is
the same everywhere.' Many scholars oppose his point of view and
argue that there are crucial differences in the political cultures of different
countries."
6 
From their point of view, the rights contained in the United
Nations documents are not necessarily valid for all peoples at any
time.
| "
At the end of World War II, almost every African country was
occupied by a Western power.' During the 1950s and '60s, a great
liberation movement arose throughout the continent, as one country after
another began to demand freedom from colonial domination and economic
168. See id.
169. See id. at 375.
170. Cobbah, supra note 12, at 315.
171. Id. at 315-16.
172. Motala, supra note 151, at 383-86.
173. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 8, at 439.
174. See Motla, supra note 151, at 377.
175. See generally M. CRANSTON, WHAT AR HUMAN RoHS? (1973).
176. See, e.g., Motala, supra note 151. at 376.
177. Id. at 377.
178. See Cobbah, supra note 12, at 316.
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exploitation. 9 Those decades were years of great turbulence for Africa,
as dozens of new nations struggled to achieve national unity and to gain
a political and economic foothold in the international community.'"
C. Birth of the African Charter
1. Purpose
Many Africans believed that at the time the Universal Declaration and
the International Covenants were drafted most of the member states of the
United Nations were states "with white populations and largely Christian
traditions." 8' Therefore, they were determined to create a uniquely
African document more responsive to African needs.'' The paramount
concern of those jurists, lawyers, and law professors who were participants
in discussions early in the 1960s, was that the masses within non-
independent Africa become aware of their rights, "thereby giving them
impetus to free themselves.
" 1  
These discussions ultimately led to the
formation of the African Charter. On October 1, 1986 the Charter was
entered into force with 26 ratifying African nations agreeing to be bound
by its provisions.'" It became the third, and is now the largest, of the
three regional human rights instruments.'
The African Charter is the legal embodiment of one of the central
aims of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, that is, the aim
of freeing the African continent from the grip of colonialism.'" The
179. See Marks, supra note 8, at 440.
180. See Motalo supra note 151, at 383-84.
181. Seminar on the Regional Commission on Human Rights with Special Reference to
Africa, U.N. Doc. STfTAO/-R/39 (1969), U.N. GAOR Supp. No. [ ], (held in Cairo, United
Arab Republic, Sept. 2-15,1969). This seminar was organized by the U.N. Division on Huan
Rights and the Government of the United Arab Republic to study the possibility of the
establishment of regional commissioners on human rights as specifically related to Africa.
Gittleman, supra note I, at 671.
182. See Gittleman, supra note 1, at 671.
183. The International Commission of Jurists convened the African Conference on the Rule
of Law in Lagos, Nigeria. The resulting resolution of the Confernce made clear the
responsibility of the world legal order to devise a regime for the protection of individuals.
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JuisTs, A REPORT ON THE PROCEEDINOS OF THE
CONEENnCE 11 (1961) (African Conference on the Rule of Law, Lagos, Nigeria, Jan 3-7,
1961).
184. Bondzie-Simpson, supra note 25, at 643.
185. The two other regional conventions are the European Convention, supra note 157, and
the American Conventioo, supra note 157.
186. African Charter, supra note 1, preamble, cl. 8, provides:
N.Y.L. SCH J. INT'L & COMP. L.
core of the Charter reflects a reaction to Africa's colonial history through
the expression of the desire for self-determination, and for sovereignty over
domestic resources.' The preamble proclaims its essential objectives
as the realization of "freedom, equality, justice and dignity.
"
" It
embodies a pledge to eradicate colonialism and achieve the total liberation
and genuine independence of the African people, through the elimination
of all forms of discrimination and the dismantling of all foreign aggressive
military bases.t'
2. Rooted in Tradition
In contrast to the prevailing individual norm of human rights
instruments inspired by Western philosophy,"a the African Charter bases
its protection of freedoms on the group norm.' African societies are
cormnuctitarian.'
9 
They exhibit a cohesiveness and sense of kinship
much more strongly than do Western societies.'
93  
In the West, the
nuclear family is the essential unit, whereas in African culture the extended
family is of far greater significance."
te 
The survival of the entire
community, and the ideals of cooperation and collective responsibility are
the essentials of African society. The African Charter does not make the
assumption that individualism is an inevitable progression from the
collectivism of African societies. Rather, it approaches the enhancement
of human dignity, which is the goal of the human rights movement, as
flowing naturally from African traditions."'
Conscious of their duty to achieve the total liberation of Africa, the peoples of
which are still struggling for their dignity and genuine independence, and
undertaking to eliminate colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, zionism and to
dismantle aggressive foreign military bases and all forms of discrimination,
partieularly those based on race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion or
political opinions.
Id.
187. African Charter, supra note 1, preamble, cl. 3.
188. id. preamble, cl. 2.
189. Id. preamble, et. 8.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 151-66.
191. Kiwanuka, supra note 6, at 84.
192. Cobbah, supra note 12, at 320.
193. dt
194. Id
195. See id. at 325.
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3. Comparison with Other Regional Documents
The main difference between the African Charter and its European
and American counterparts is its conscious use of African legal
philosophy and African tradition in the selection and presentation of
human rights.' 9' The concept of peoples' rights is drawn directly
from the African tradition of the collective and represents a perfect
actualization of the Charter's determination to base itself on the values
of African civilization. 197
The Charter also protects conventional rights.'" All three
regional conventions stipulate the most elementary rights to be the
protection of life and liberty,'" ' the right to protection from torture
and degrading or inhumane treatment,20 ' and liberty of the person and
a fair trial.2 ' The Charter's stated intent to draw on African values
and traditions may be seen as reflected in its other provisions. For
instance, while the European and American Conventions protect
individual privacy and family life,
2° 
the African Charter imposes on
states the positive duty "to assist the family which is the custodian of
morals and traditional values recognized by the community."0 3 In
the realm of property considerations, the American Convention ensures
196. See Okere, Huonan Rights and the African Charter, 6 HuM. RTs. Q. 141, 153-56
(1984).
197. See Motas, supra note 151 at 397.
198. See Okere, supra note 196, at 153. The African Commission is encouraged to draw
inspiration from internatioral instruments, and the preamble of the Charter specifically reaffirmns
to promote international cooperation with "due regard for the Universal Declaration and the
U.N. Charter." U.N. CHARTEs, supra note 1, preamble, cl. 1. Therefore, it is not surprising
that many of the essential rights and freedoms to be found in the African Charter are similar
to those in the other regional documents. Okere, supra note 196, at 153.
199. European Convention, supra note 157, arts. 1,2,4,5 & 6; American Convention, supra
note 155, arts. 4, 6 & 7; African Charter, supranote 1, art. 6.
200. European Convention, supra note 157, art. 3; American Convention, supra note 157,
art. 5; African Charter, supra note 1, art. 5.
201. European Convention, supra note 157, arts. 5,6; American Convention, supranote 157,
at. 7; African Charter, supra note 1, arts 4, 5, 6.
202. European Convention, supra note 157, art. 8; American Convention, supra note 157,
at. 17.
203. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 18, para. 2. Slightly surprising is the fact that while
the American Convention, but not the European, has a provision for the equal treatment of
illegitimate children, the African Charter, despite its tradition of polygamous marriages, has no
such provision. Id. This, say the Charter's authors, is for the sake of not giving offense to the
Moslems and Christianas. Okere, supra note 196, at 155.
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compensation to everyone deprived of his property,'" while the
African Charter states that property rights "may only be encroached
upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the
community .. 205
Lastly, the African Charter does not provide a court system for the
settlement of disputes.'
e  
In Europe, claims brought under the
European Convention may be heard by the European Court of Human
Rights."
0 
Similarly, claims brought under the American Convention
are submitted to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
0
Disputes or claims that arise under the African Charter are limited to
amicable and diplomatic settlement.
2
"t The authors of the Charter
insisted that this feature, like much of the Charter, is more suited to
traditional methods of settling disputes through friendly arbitration than
to the adversarial approach of the West.' However, there are many
busy courts all over Africa, where litigation is a highly successful and
accepted mechanism for settlement of disputes.
2t
' The more likely
explanation is that African nations are still understandably jealous of
their new found sovereignty and are therefore less than willing to
surrender even a small part of it for the sake of disputes.'
Overall, the African Charter is closer to the American Convention
concept of guaranteed rights than it is to the European, because of the
emphasis it places upon social and economic rights rather than civil and
political rights."
t
204. American Convention, supra note 157, art. 21, pata. 2,
205. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 14.
206. Boendie-Simpson, supra note 25, at 662.
207. Okere, supra note 196, at 156. The European Commission on Human tRights receives
approximately 3000 applications for cases to be heard each year. Id. at 154. The Commission
has legal authority, and it either pronounces a case inadmissible, issues its own judgment on the
merits, or refers the case to the Court for decision. Id. Each year, five percent of applications
are referred to the Court. Id.
208. Id. at 156-57.
209. li at 156.
210. Bondzie-Simpson, supra note 25, at 662.
211. See id. at 663-64. The author strongly advocates the establishment of an African Court
of Human Rights, for the Commission is limited in its ability to resolve disputes, and although
a number of eases coming before the courts have defied settlement, courts may also favour and
encourage amicable settlement. Id at 663.
212. Okere, supra note 196, at 158.
213. Id at 155.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Those human rights norms that are characterized as civil and
political emerged in response to the political revolutions of the
eighteenth century that arose in reaction to abuse and violation of those
rights."
4 
Social, economic, and cultural norms emanated from the
socialist revolutions of the early twentieth century.
2 5  
The new





dominant universal social trend of the 1980s is a movement away from
the concept of the nation-state toward a global perspective, with the
concomitant need for international cooperation."
7 
The fundamental
awareness that, without global cooperation, the survival of the planet
is unlikely, much less the establishment of a decent standard of life,
brings the new rights sharply to the fore, and demands their immediate
implementation."
8
Interference with the ecosystem and pollution of the environment
have multinational consequences and can no longer be dealt with by a
single nation. Dozens of Third World countries aspire to development,
having at last achieved independence from the centuries old yoke of
colonialism, and aspire to the civilization of the industrialized nations.
Natural disasters occur more frequently than ever before and no nation
is beyond their reach. Organizations such as the Red Cross are unable
to cope with the havoc that such disasters wreak and humanitarian
assistance from the world community is required.
Most significantly, the right to live in international peace represents
a reaction to the nuclear threat, for a nation no longer can remain
unaffected by a war of aggression between other nations possessing
nuclear weapons. Further, even non-nuclear conflict is nothing but a
precursor to major power involvement and a threat of imminent nuclear
destruction. Consequently, peoples of all nations are demanding that
their governments actively support international peace measures.
The drafters of the African Charter, through their ingenuity, and
their progressive and courageous spirit, have succeeded in bringing
many important issues to the attention of the international legal
community. The resistance to awarding legal status to the new rights
214. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
216. Marks, upra note 8, at 440.
217. See id at 441.
218. See Sohn, supra note 32, at 63.
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appears to arise from states tending to conceive of rights in terms of
their concrete realization via systems of law enforcement. International
law, however, does not work in the same manner. Rather, it evolves
from custom and general expectation, not by means of a system of
universal law enforcement, and although there is a world court,
compliance is most frequently achieved by the pressure of world public
opinion.
2 9
There has been some skepticism about the African Charter's ability
to enforce its provisions without a court. However, enforcement of the
rights to peace, development, and the environment, would not appear
to be effected by means of a court-ordered system, but rather by the
pressure of public opinion. These new rights first need to be given
legal recognition. The immediate future may not seem to yield much,
but only the continued endorsement of them as norms will eventually
lead to their realization."'
Although there are universal components to human rights," the
way in which they are conceptualized in a non-Westem culture is
fundamentally different from Western, and United Nations', presenta-
tions of the same rights.
222 
Failure to recognize the importance of
cultural differences has been suggested as the reason for the Universal
Declaration's inability to achieve its objective of arriving at a consen-
sus on human rights.
223 If human rights in Africa, or anywhere else
in the world, are to be assured of protection in the future, cultural
differences must be taken into account. The African Charter performs
this important function.
Resultantly, regional instruments that are drafted in the future are
likely to look to the African Charter as a model human rights instru-
ment that conveys the needs of nations and peoples in terms of their
cultural values.
224 
The Charter has succeeded in taking norms well-
known to Westerners from their incorporation in the Universal
Declaration and other international instruments and adapting them to
identified local traditions. At the same time, it has given fresh impetus
219. See Lopatka, supra note 69, at 363.
220. See Alston, supra note 112, at 126.
221. All societies manifest some notion of human rights, and certain provisions such as the
right to life and the right against torture see to be universally accepted. See Motala, supra note
151, at 379.
222. Id
223. Id. at 377.
224. African Charter, supra note 1, preamble, cl. 4.
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to new rights and has legitimized them by relating them meaningfully
and contextually to the circumstantial underpinnings of the docu-
ment."
It is too early to determine just how effective the Charter will be
in achieving protection of the human rights of the African people, but
the use of African values in their conceptualization has met with
enthusiastic approval.226 The African Charter is both a regional
response to human rights concerns and a reflection of the realities of
Africa. Thus it is indeed a positive achievement .
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225. See van Boven, supra note 2, at 184,
226. See, e.g., Bondzie-Simpsnon, supra note 25, at 664; Motala, supra note 151, at 409;
Cobbah, supra note 12, at 331.
227. See Motala, supra note 151, at 409.

